Israel’s military admits failures on Oct. 7. Its probe of the assault might put stress on Netanyahu

TEL AVIV, Israel — An investigation by the Israeli army has decided that Hamas was in a position to perform the deadliest assault in Israeli historical past on Oct. 7, 2023, as a result of the rather more highly effective Israeli military misjudged the militant group’s intentions and underestimated its capabilities.

The findings, launched Thursday, might stress Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a broadly demanded broader inquiry to look at the political decision-making that preceded the assault, which triggered the conflict in Gaza.

Many Israelis imagine the errors of Oct. 7 prolong past the army, they usually blame Netanyahu for what they view as a failed technique of deterrence and containment within the years main as much as the assault. That technique included permitting Qatar to ship suitcases of money into Gaza and sidelining Hamas’ rival, the internationally acknowledged Palestinian Authority.

The prime minister has not taken accountability, saying he’ll reply powerful questions solely after the conflict, which has been paused for almost six weeks by a tenuous ceasefire. Regardless of public stress, together with from the households of the roughly 1,200 individuals killed within the Oct. 7 assault and the 251 taken as hostages into Gaza, Netanyahu has resisted requires a fee of inquiry.

The army’s primary findings have been that the area’s strongest and complicated army misinterpret Hamas’ intentions, underestimated its capabilities and was wholly unprepared for the shock assault by hundreds of closely armed militants within the early morning hours of a significant Jewish vacation.

In feedback made to army commanders Monday, and shared with the media on Thursday, the military’s chief of employees, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, stated he took accountability for the military’s failures.

“I used to be the commander of the army on October seventh, and I’ve my very own accountability. I additionally carry the load of all of your accountability — that, too, I see as mine,” stated Halevi, who introduced his resignation in January and is ready to step down subsequent week.

The army’s findings are in step with previous conclusions reached by officers and analysts. The army launched solely a abstract of the report and army officers outlined its findings.

“Oct. 7 was an entire failure,” stated one army official, who spoke on situation of anonymity in step with laws.

A central false impression was that Hamas, which seized management of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in 2007, was extra eager about governing the territory than combating Israel, the inquiry discovered.

The army additionally misjudged the militant group’s capabilities. Army planners had envisioned that, at worst, Hamas might stage a floor invasion from as much as eight border factors, the official stated. Actually, Hamas had greater than 60 assault routes.

Intelligence assessed within the aftermath of the assault has proven Hamas got here near staging the offensive on three earlier events however delayed it for unknown causes, the official stated.

The official stated that within the hours earlier than the assault, there have been indicators that one thing was amiss, together with when Hamas fighters switched their telephones over to the Israeli community.

The notion that Hamas didn’t need conflict guided resolution makers away from taking motion that evening that may have thwarted the assault. The Israeli army official stated intelligence exhibits that Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the Oct. 7 assault who was killed final October, had begun planning it as early as 2017.

With the army off guard on a vacation weekend, Hamas launched a heavy wave of rockets that allowed hundreds of fighters to burst by way of the safety fence or fly over it on grasp gliders. They knocked out surveillance cameras and rapidly overwhelmed a whole bunch of troopers stationed alongside the border.

From there they superior to key freeway intersections and attacked troops dispatched to the realm, together with some senior officers, disrupting the army’s command and management, in response to a second army official, who additionally spoke on situation of anonymity.

For the primary three hours after the assault, Hamas fighters marauded by way of border communities and a music competition with little resistance. That was when a lot of the 251 hostages have been taken and most of the people have been killed, the official stated. The official stated the chaos led to pleasant hearth incidents, though he stated there weren’t many, with out disclosing a determine.

It took hours for the army to regain management and days till the realm was totally cleared of militants.

In line with the primary official, the report blamed the army for being overconfident in its data and never exhibiting sufficient doubt in its core ideas and beliefs. The abstract stated a key lesson was that Israel couldn’t let a menace develop on its border.

It spelled out a number of suggestions, together with creating particular models meant to organize for such shock and large-scale occasions, in addition to reform within the army intelligence division that will foster “openness, skepticism, listening, studying.”

It didn’t place blame on any particular person troopers or officers, however is prone to pave the best way for a reckoning within the army and eventual dismissals.

Some high-ranking officers aside from Halevi have additionally resigned, together with the previous head of army intelligence.